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Abstract 
The law of Scotland has barely recognised the existence of private prosecutors and 
the preferred policy has been prosecution by a public prosecutor in the public 
interest. The legal persona engaged in public prosecution in the Sheriff Court has 
been traditionally the Procurator Fiscal. The move towards the modern system of 
public prosecution necessarily required legislative authority from the Imperial 
Parliament. The Sheriff Court reform in 1877 altered the dynamics of judicial 
oversight of the local public prosecutor and revealed something of the structure of 
authority. Elements of the concepts of the inquisitorial and accusatorial influence may 
be seen in these changes.  
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Introduction 
One mid-Victorian commentator compared contemporary criminal courts and 
contrasted the approach in England and Scotland: it was at most either: ‘litigation or 
inquisition’.1 Reform of Scots law seemed to accentuate rather than reconcile 
differences between the legal systems of the United Kingdom.2 The Sheriff Court 
(Scotland) Act 1877 took effect on 1 October 1877 and made provision for the 
appointment and removal of Procurators Fiscal as local public prosecutor in the 
Sheriff Court. The Act has been mentioned in a historical survey but with little 
discussion.3 Perhaps contemporaries were unsure of its true importance: one 
Member of Parliament said in the debate on the Bill that the indifference of the 
Government then to Scottish business was such that the proposed legislation might 
                                                 
* Solicitor in the Supreme Courts of Scotland, robertshiels@hotmail.com I am grateful to 
Professor Peter Duff of the University of Aberdeen for commenting on a draft of this paper 
although the writer alone is responsible for the result.  
1
 Anonymous, ‘The City of Glasgow Bank Failure and Trial’, British Quarterly Review, 70 
(1879) 157-177, p.165 
2
 RC, ‘On the Investigation of Crime in Scotland’, (1864) 8 Journal of Jurisprudence 473.    
3
 D.M. Walker, A Legal History of Scotland: The Nineteenth Century (Edinburgh: Butterworths 
Lexis Nexis, 2001), vol.6, p.358.  
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more properly be entitled: ‘A Bill to relieve Her Majesty’s Government from the 
imputation of doing nothing for Scotland’.4  
 
Several reasons justify revisiting the reform: first, the development of the common 
law does not take place in a vacuum. Any analysis of the law in practice must offer 
something about the balance of power and authority ex officio amongst the office-
holders.5 In this respect ‘authority’ is not merely an abstract concept but the actions 
of participants in the administration of criminal justice.6 Secondly, the balance of 
power and authority varies over time and note ought to be taken of that and the 
inherent changes.7 Finally, criminal trials are never exclusively about the 
identification and punishment of wrongdoers; they are also about the relation 
between the legal and social order.8  
 
The available evidence suggests that the reform of 1877 implemented an intention to 
move authority for immediate judicial supervision of the local public prosecutor to 
centralised direction accountable to the Imperial Parliament. The 1877 Act may be 
considered to be a statement of constitutional principle in an era of incremental 
change. Taken together the context of these elements shape prospective attitudes to 
authority.9 That context suggests a developing tendency to attain uniform policies 
through centralisation, an ordering of the participating agencies (a term taken at its 
widest) and preference for precise and rigid normative directives rather than more 
flexible standards. 10  
 
1 Prior to the Reform of 1877   
There was in Scotland until 1877 comparatively weak central government in the 
sense that there was only a little local supervision of the decision-making capacity of 
the local public prosecutors. The Lord Advocate was the public prosecutor for 
                                                 
4
 HC Deb, July 28, 1877, vol.236, c.108: that tetchiness followed from the Bill being called at 
very short notice for debate on a Saturday. 
5
 In Cadder v HM Advocate (2011) UKSC 13, Lord Rodger of Earlsferry at pp.42-44, para[74] 
–[80], considered briefly the professional relationship between the Sheriff-Substitute and the 
Procurator Fiscal. 
6
 D. Hay, Property, Authority and the Criminal Law in D. Hay et al (eds.) Albion’s Fatal Tree: 
Crime and Society in Eighteenth-Century England (London: Peregrine Books, 1977) pp.52-
53. 
7
 P. Duff, ‘Adversarial Ideology and Police Questioning after Charge’, (2013) Juridical Review 
1.  
8
 L. Farmer, Criminal Responsibility and the Proof of Guilt in MD Dubber and L Farmer (eds.) 
Modern Histories of Crime and Punishment (Stanford University Press, 2007). 
9
 M. Damaska, ‘Structures of Authority and Comparative Criminal Procedure’, Yale Law 
Journal, 84, 480-544, (1975), p.540.  
10
 Damaska, ‘Structures of Authority and Comparative Criminal Procedure’, p.484. 
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Scotland and as Law Officer the principal legal adviser about Scots law to the British 
Government in London. The Lord Advocate was invariably a Member of Parliament. 
Operating at the national level the Lord Advocate was in no position to engage with 
local and unremarkable decisions unless some matter of principle became involved.   
 
The broadly unrestrained exercise of discretion in local matters was in effect an evil 
to be tolerated until more precise guidelines, such as the Book of Regulations of 
1868, were formulated and promulgated to Procurators Fiscal. Moreover, Lord 
Glencorse spoke then, justifying other reform, of it being a time of:  
 rapid movement in society. Transactions go on so much faster than they did; 
 things are carried out so much more quickly; communication between one 
 part of the country and another was so much more constant…11  
 
Appeals were competent in some circumstances but calling up the prosecution’s 
papers for an occasional prosecution, however, could not constitute meaningful 
review of past practice or general policy. In truth, there may not have been much that 
could be called general policy. 
 
It has been suggested that not all Procurators Fiscal were qualified as lawyers.12 The 
Procurator Fiscal on appointment held an office in the performance of which he owed 
a duty, not to a client, but to the Court, to the members of his own profession, and to 
the public interest. These suggest limitations on the discretion of Procurators Fiscal. 
There is a fine example of those limits: on questions of divergence between charges 
at the committal stage and the evidence that would support such charges it has been 
noted early in the nineteenth century that there were competent means of revising 
any over-enthusiastic, and therefore incorrect, selection of charges: ‘the Sheriff might 
control [emphasis added] his Fiscal on such an occasion’.13     
 
It may be deduced that, in an era of slow communications and comparatively long 
distances from minimal central authority, it was entirely possible that central 
government may have had little knowledge of local appointments.14 Indeed a 
contemporary concern was the abolition of patronage in all forms since this was ‘the 
                                                 
11
 J. Crabb Watt, John Inglis, Lord Justice General of Scotland: A Memoir, (Edinburgh, W 
Green, 1893) p.56. 
12
 A.V. Sheehan and DJ. Dickson, Criminal Procedure (Edinburgh: Lexis Nexis, 2
nd
 edn 
2003), 23, but the actual number of unqualified office-holders is uncertain as the legal 
profession had been reformed by the Law Agents (Scotland) Act 1873.    
13
 D. Hume Commentaries on the Law of Scotland Respecting Crime (Edinburgh, Bell & 
Bradfute, 1844) vol.2, p.90.  
14
 HC Deb, August 2, 1877, vol.236, c.352. 
Law, Crime and History (2014) 3 
59 
 
source of every evil’.15 In attempting to discern the precise nature of the legal 
relationship between Sheriff and Procurator Fiscal it may be, at the very least, that 
delectus personae was a relevant consideration.16 There was some indication of a 
general unease about the working relationship that might develop.17 Nevertheless, 
the policy of the unreformed structure of authority seems, at least until the contrary is 
proved, to have been designed to maintain independent judicial supervision that in 
practice disallowed prosecutorial decisions based on the capricious attitudes of the 
private prosecutor as was apparently an acceptable norm elsewhere.18  
 
Sheriffs were generally in practice as seniors at the Bar and also part-time appellate 
Judges with the first instance forensic duties delegated to Sheriffs-Substitute.19 In 
1878 there were 21 Sheriffs20 and 47 Sheriff-Substitutes.21 There were 58 County 
Procurators Fiscal22 and 74 Justice of the Peace Procurators Fiscal.23 The police 
were characterised by multiple jurisdictions and a lack of centralised control.24 As late 
as 1889 nearly half of the forces had less than 20 officers and at the end of the 
century there were still 64 separate police forces in Scotland.25  
 
By the mid-century, the view was that the Procurator Fiscal in the Sheriff Court was 
the officer of the Sheriff and the Procurator Fiscal was entirely under the control of 
the Sheriff. 26 Thus, on 6 March 1877 the Lord Advocate (Wm. Watson) was able to 
say in stark language in an answer to a Parliamentary Question, about some 
Procurators Fiscal charging fees for certain prosecutions and others not doing so: 
                                                 
15
 O. MacDonagh, Early Victorian Government, 1830-1870 (London: Weidenfeld and 
Nicolson, 1977) p.206. 
16
 The practical arrangements ought not to be overlooked: in Sheriff Court Houses of the mid-
Victorian era the Sheriff and the Procurator Fiscal probably had their own personal chambers 
in the same building, whereas the solicitors attending court may only have had use of a library 
or common room.   
17
 RC, ‘On the Investigation of Crime in Scotland’, p.480.  
18
 c.f. Hay, Property, Authority and the Criminal Law, pp.40-43. 
19
 The modern terminology of Sheriff Principal and Sheriff, respectively, date from the Sheriff 
Courts (Scotland) Act 1971 s.4(1). 
20
 The Scottish Law List and Legal Directory for 1878, (Edinburgh, Wm. Paterson, 1878) 
pp.353-4. 
21
 Ibid pp.354-5, not counting the six ‘Assistants’ at Elgin, two ‘Honorary Sheriff-Substitutes’ at 
Banff and the one vacancy at Cromarty. 
22
 Ibid pp.354-5, not counting the one ‘Assistant’ and the seven ‘Deputes’.  
23
 Ibid pp.363-5. The figures are probably not what they seem as some individuals held two 
appointments such as John Maclullich, who was both County and JP Procurator Fiscal at 
Inverary.    
24
 D.G. Barrie, Police in the Age of Improvement: Police Development and the Civil Tradition 
in Scotland, 1775-1865, (Cullompton: Willan Publishing, 2008). 
25
 Walker, A Legal History of Scotland, p.202.   
26
 Rose v Grant (1853) 25 Scottish Jurist 535 per Lord Ivory, p.536. 
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 The patronage of the office of Procurator Fiscal belongs to the Sheriff, and in 
 the event of disobedience of his orders [emphasis added], whether the 
 Procurator Fiscal likes them or not, he has the power of dismissing the 
 Procurator Fiscal without explanation or apology.27  
 
To state the matter another way: while the Lord Advocate was in virtual control of the 
Procurator Fiscal, in law the Procurator Fiscal remained an officer of the Sheriff who 
continued to be responsible for his selection, appointment and dismissal. The Lord 
Advocate, for the avoidance of doubt, had no control in law over a Sheriff especially 
as the latter since 1832 had held a commission ad vitam aut culpam28 and from 1838 
a Sheriff might be dismissed only by the Lord President and the Lord Justice Clerk.29 
 
Consequently, if a Procurator Fiscal failed to perform his duties in a satisfactory 
manner, no real sanction was available to the Lord Advocate (or the Treasury) other 
than attempting to persuade the Sheriff to revoke the Procurator Fiscal’s 
commission.30 The supervisory power of the Sheriff over his own Procurator Fiscal 
was essentially one of an inherent authority to appoint, direct and remove. One can 
only speculate as to whether, and if so to what extent, the shrieval supervisory power 
included local policy or individual prosecutorial decisions. 
 
The centrality of the Sheriff to operational efficiency, in law at least, ought not to be 
under-estimated. Section 15 of the Police (Scotland) Act 1857 provided:  
 The Constable acting under this Act shall, in addition to their ordinary duties, 
 perform all such duties connected with the police in their respective counties 
 as the Sheriff or the Justices of the Peace of the County may from time to 
 time direct and require [emphasis added].31  
 
Moreover, by s.78 of the same Act of 1857 it was provided that the word ‘Sheriff’ and 
the words ‘the Sheriff’ included Sheriff-Substitute as well as the Sheriff. Accordingly, 
the supervisory power of the Sheriff and the Sheriff-Substitute extended to such 
police as were available in his jurisdiction.  
 
That supervisory power was not the only one that might competently be exercised by 
the Sheriffs as later by s.86 of the Burgh Police (Scotland) Act 1892:  
                                                 
27
 HC vol.232, cc.1450-1.       
28
 Walker, A Legal History of Scotland: The Nineteenth Century, vol.6, p.358. 
29
 Sheriff Court (Scotland) Act 1838 s.3. 
30
 Stair Memorial Encyclopaedia (Edinburgh: Lexis Nexis; 1989) vol.17 Control and Removal 
from Office para.535.   
31
 The prosecutor and the police were then distinct, and that remains the position: HM 
Advocate v Wright, 2007 SCCR 258 per Lord MacFadyen p.268F, para.31. 
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 the chief constable and constables shall obey the orders of the magistrates, 
 and at all times afford their aid and assistance to the magistrates, and to all 
 other judges and magistrates having jurisdiction within the burgh, in all 
 matters relating to the preservation of peace and good order, the suppression 
 of nuisance, and the removal of obstruction within the burgh.  
 
The Sheriff-Substitute in the late Victorian era as tribunal of fact had in law a power 
to direct the local police, appoint and remove the local public prosecutor, and after 
1887 enhanced powers to amend the charge on summary complaints or indictments 
before him to ensure the relevance of the evidence at trial.   
 
2 A Contemporary Discussion  
Sheriff-Substitute Francis Russell in a talk to the Scottish Law Amendment Society in 
1870 noted harshness in the application of Scottish criminal procedure when 
compared to England.32 The problem of accountability was not irrelevant to the 
subject matter.33 Reference was made to the comment of Lord Barcaple that the 
Procurator Fiscal was ‘the hand of the Sheriff’. He referred to the duties of the 
Procurator Fiscal which included that of taking precognitions that is to say the 
interviewing of witnesses summoned to his office and the writing down of evidence in 
statement form.   
 
Sheriff-Substitute Russell recalled that previously the Sheriff was always present at 
precognition, but for many years that practice had been almost uniformly otherwise. 
He thought that in the years prior to his talk the Sheriff of Zetland had in all cases 
personally taken the precognition. There was a contemporary report that the Sheriff 
at Cupar had attended all precognitions for serious cases: ‘as a general rule, in all 
pleas of the Crown’.34 He thought the practice of Sheriffs attending precognition had 
long been a general practice. The presence of the judge of fact at the taking of 
precognitions might mean that at trial he was better prepared although it was 
recognised that there was a danger in that early knowledge of jumping to 
conclusions. 35  
 
 
 
                                                 
32
 (1870) 14 Journal of Jurisprudence pp.259-260. 
33
 Ibid pp.259, 260 and Lord Colonsay at p.261. 
34
 Ibid pp.259, 263: c.f ‘It very rarely happens that the Sheriff directed a prosecution and sat 
as Judge in a case’: HC Deb, August 2, 1877, vol.236, c.353. Perhaps it was rare but it 
seemed to be procedure that was not then incompetent in law. 
35
 Ibid pp.259, p.264. 
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Views of lawyers on the changes 
A Report of a Committee of the Faculty of Advocates detailed their view of the 
reforming Bill.36 As to the appointment of the Procurator Fiscal the Committee 
believed that the proposed change was inexpedient. It was thought, but not 
unanimously, that under the existing system it was advisable that the Procurator 
Fiscal:  
 should be under the direction and control of the Sheriff on whom the 
 responsibility of preventing and investigating crime ultimately rests. In cases 
 of delicacy, or where prompt action is required, it is of benefit to the public 
 interest that the Procurator Fiscal should be able to consult a superior 
 authority upon the spot.37  
 
The Committee thought that any change would ‘tend to throw out of gear a system 
which has hitherto worked well and the efficiency of which has generally been 
acknowledged’.38 A majority of the Committee was also concerned that if, as 
happened, patronage of the office of Procurator Fiscal were vested in the 
Government, the appointments would be liable to be influenced by political 
considerations, and would be conferred as the reward of party services.  
 On the other hand, the minority of the Committee think that the old theory-that 
 the Sheriff should be both prosecutor and judge in criminal cases-was never 
 sound in principle, and has been superseded in practice. They think that the 
 Procurator Fiscal is now really under the orders of the Lord Advocate, and 
 that to make his tenure of office no longer depend upon the Sheriff is merely 
 to conform the law in that particular to modern usage.39  
 
The reform  
One writer deplored the spirit of acrimony about the reforms ‘in letters and leaders in 
the daily press; a matter like the present ought to be commented upon with calmness 
and impartiality, and party feeling above all should be laid aside’.40 The comment in 
the House of Commons about the clause in the 1877 Bill dealing with the 
appointment of salaried Procurators Fiscal is instructive as a matter of constitutional 
law: 41  
 The great safeguard against appointments being made improperly was that 
 the officer of the Crown with whom the appointment rested should be 
 responsible to the House.   
 
                                                 
36
 (1877) 21 Journal of Jurisprudence 452 
37
 Ibid p.453. 
38
 Ibid p.453. 
39
 Ibid p.454: no source of that ‘old theory’ is mentioned. 
40
 Ibid p.453. 
41
 HC Deb, August 2, 1877, vol.236, c.357. 
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The 1877 Act established authoritatively the independence ex officio of the 
Procurator Fiscal: by s.5 no person holding the salaried [emphasis added] office of 
Procurator Fiscal was removable from office, except by one of the Principal 
Secretaries of State, for inability or misbehaviour, after obtaining a report of the Lord 
President of the Court of Session and the Lord Justice Clerk. By s.6 the appointment 
of Procurator Fiscal was to be made by the Sheriff ‘with the approval’ of one of the 
Principal Secretaries of State.42 New and existing appointments to the office of 
Procurator Fiscal could not be removed from office except in the manner provided for 
in the Act.  
 
It remains a matter of conjecture now as to what was required to be done to come to 
the notice of the two most senior Judges in Scotland and, conjunctively, to be the 
subject of a report which it may be assumed was not a matter of inquiry that the 
Judges had undertaken ex proprio motu. Conversely, allowing a Procurator Fiscal a 
degree of latitude in the exercise of professional skill and judgment that an ordinarily 
competent public prosecutor might reasonably be expected to exercise suggests that 
the two most senior Judges in Scotland would report adversely only in the most 
extreme of circumstances. The security of tenure implicit on appointment was 
extensive, probably quasi-judicial in effect, and allowed the incumbent in practice a 
high degree of security from outside influence.    
  
By s.7 it was restated as a matter of principle that no Sheriff had the power after the 
passing of the Act to nominate or appoint any person to perform the duties of 
Procurator Fiscal, but the rigidity of that rule was ameliorated by the additional point 
that it was lawful for a Procurator Fiscal with the leave of the Lord Advocate and the 
Sheriff expressed in writing to grant a deputation to one or more ‘fit persons’ to be 
named in such writing ‘for whose acting he [the Procurator Fiscal] shall be 
responsible, to sign writs, to appear in Court, and to conduct prosecutions and 
inquiries in his name, and on his behalf’.43 With a vacancy in the office of Procurator 
                                                 
42
 Constitutional control was a notable contemporary development. The executive by means 
of extensive standing orders at this point was beginning to extend the means of majority 
control of the House of Commons. These powers were designed chiefly for the purpose of 
combating abuses that sprang up then: P. Fraser, ‘The Growth of Ministerial Control in the 
Nineteenth Century House of Commons’, English Historical Review (1960) 75 (296) 444-63 at 
p.445.  
43
 This was a significant change and probably necessary by statute on account of the well-
established principle of delegata potestas non potest delegari [a delegated power cannot be 
further delegated]. In short, the Sheriff-Substitute had delegated the investigative powers to 
his selected Procurator Fiscal but without statutory authority the Procurator Fiscal could not 
competently pass the work on to another.    
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Fiscal any Depute appointed in terms of s.7 could by the same provision discharge 
the office of Procurator Fiscal until the vacancy was filled. 
 
3 The Changed Dynamics 
It is not difficult to see within the reform several themes that suggested a changed 
legal and political environment: perhaps the most obvious of these new ideas was 
the personal and Parliamentary accountability that followed the 1877 Act. The 
personal accountability arose by s.6 because the appointment of Procurator Fiscal to 
be made by the Sheriff was with the approval of one of the Principal Secretaries of 
State. That suggests some explanation for any particular appointment was required. 
Moreover, an appointment made the Secretary of State was a decision for which he 
was accountable to Parliament should any doubt arise from the actions or decisions 
of a Procurator Fiscal.  
 
At the very least the payment by the Treasury of salaries to Procurators Fiscal 
required that there be some accountability.44 Such payment was of course a clear 
indication of the use of lawyers and their directed application of the law as an 
instrument of government in the widest sense. Finally, Scotland was hardly an 
outpost of the Empire but there was still a need for London, albeit with a degree of 
political latitude, to be able to control what ultimately was the responsibility of the 
British Government.45        
 
Lord Kilbrandon described the Sheriff-Substitute in unspecified earlier times as that 
both of ‘executive examiner into criminal activities and also of judicial officer 
responsible for assembling and assessing the evidence against persons who are to 
be put on trial’.46 The delegation of the latter task to the Procurator Fiscal was in 
essence to pass on the duties of initial investigation and the conduct of trials. That 
delegation could not be to an independent officer holder, given the retained power of 
the judiciary to appoint and dismiss the local public prosecutor at will.  
 
It is not too outrageous a proposition to argue that the delegated investigations and 
the forensic duties were not adjudicated upon by the Sheriff but rather revised and 
approved or perhaps disapproved according to circumstances. The Sheriff could not 
                                                 
44
 Anonymous, ‘A Procurator Fiscal-What He Was, And Is And Will Be: Part X’, (1877) 21 
Journal of Jurisprudence 556-563, pp.557-8.  
45
 G.H.L. Le May, The Victorian Constitution, (London, Duckworth, 1979) p.121.  
46
 J.A. Coutts, The Accused: A Comparative Study, (London: Stevens: 1966) ch.4 Scotland: 
Pre-trial Procedure, p.67. 
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be said merely to be a revising lawyer as such but neither could he approach the 
Crown case as one alternative of two competing sides. The Procurator Fiscal both 
prior to the 1877 reforms and after until the 1907 reform was to some degree 
independent of the Bench and yet part of the judicial hierarchical structure.         
 
What was the position in practice of a Procurator Fiscal? One Judge said, admittedly 
in a different legal context, that: 
 A man cannot serve two masters in this sense-that in the performance of the 
 same act he is employed separately, both by A and by B. He may do so in 
 this sense-that in the performance of a single act he is employed both by A 
 and B jointly.47 
 
A more nuanced explanation in the context of criminal procedure is available. 
Procurators Fiscal then: ‘were serving two masters. They were appointed by the 
Sheriff, and had to take his directions in the investigation of crime. But the moment 
the prisoner was committed for trial, they [Procurators Fiscal] became the servants of 
the Lord Advocate, and had to take their directions from him’.48 In short, in the 
investigation stage the Procurator Fiscal was required to follow the directions from 
the Sheriff but with a prima facie case the matter became the responsibility of the 
Lord Advocate to whom the Procurator Fiscal then was required to defer. These 
functions of the Procurator Fiscal were not necessarily inconsistent in principle or 
practice.  
 
Two further points might usefully be added: first, if the Lord Advocate through Crown 
Counsel instructed trial on indictment in the Sheriff Court the matter in effect was 
remitted back to the Sheriff who had original responsibility. At least, it might be said, 
someone out of the immediate hierarchy had taken the decision, but in effect the 
investigation of an incident had been carried out by the judicial manager at the trial of 
the matter. Secondly, there has always been a skewed view of the true state of the 
system in judging it by the merits or the working of a system by indictment case. 
Even in the mid-Victorian era summary procedure was growing in importance and the 
close working relationship of the investigator and the fact finder remains a relevant 
albeit uncertain factor.      
 
                                                 
47
 North British Railway Company v Leadburn Railway Company and Waddell, (1865) 3 
Macpherson 340 per Lord Justice Clerk (Lord Glencorse) at p.345. 
48
 HC Deb, July 28, 1877, vol.236, c.89.  
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However, with instructions competently issued by the Lord Advocate, there was at 
the very least a possibility that Procurators Fiscal were being compromised on 
conflicting views on the facts of specific circumstances. The attitude of the Sheriffs as 
judges at first instance and the Lord Advocate as the supreme public prosecutor 
could never be identical, especially with old authority that the public prosecutor could 
not be compelled to prosecute in any case. 49  
 
The reforms were not admired universally as nearly 20 years after the changes came 
into effect a note was published about the matter: ‘Can a Sheriff Appoint an Interim 
Prosecutor?’50 The intention of the reform in 1877 had been to restrict the previous 
authority to do so. The writer pointed to the High Court of Justiciary recently then 
reserving to itself the authority to appoint a Prosecutor: Hill v Finlayson.51 Prior to the 
1877 reforms a Sheriff, it was pointed out, might appoint as many Procurators Fiscal 
as he pleased and he could do so at any time: Maclean v Cameron 52 and Macrae v 
Cooper 53 It seemed to have been contemplated that in an emergency ‘such as the 
sudden illness of the Prosecutor in the middle of a trial, and the absence or non-
existence of his Depute, the Sheriff would be powerless to proceed.’54  
 
The suggestion then was that the statute of 1877 ought to be amended to restore to 
the Sheriff the power possessed by Judges in Scotland. No miscarriage of justice 
was alleged in the discussion but the sentiment seemed to be that something might 
go wrong, and canvassing the point suggested that it was more than a possibility. 
While not said so explicitly, umbrage seems to have been taken to the Judges of the 
High Court of Justiciary retaining a power that was also exercisable by Justices of the 
Peace: the Sheriffs were alone in being curtailed by statute.     
 
There was some prescience in the remarks of the Committee. By the Edwardian era 
the extent of political preference had reached embarrassing proportions.55 These lists 
concluded with the remark from the anonymous compliers that: 
 we have not given the names of any Procurator Fiscal appointed in Scotland 
 during the twenty years under consideration, as these appointments are not 
                                                 
49
 J.H.A. Macdonald, A Practical Treatise on the Criminal Law of Scotland, (Edinburgh, W 
Paterson, first edn, 1867), p.314. 
50
 (1895-96) 3 SLT 27. 
51
 (1883) 5 Couper 284. 
52
 (1845) 2 Broun 657. 
53
 (1884) 5 Couper 657. 
54
 (1895-96) 3 S.L.T. 27. 
55
 Anonymous, ‘Twenty Years of Legal and Official Patronage’, (1906) 22 Scottish Law 
Review 4, p.37. 
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 always political, being made by the Sheriff Principal with the approval of the 
 Secretary for Scotland, which is never withheld.56  
 
Why that generally non-political status had developed is difficult to explain easily but 
it may be that the financial position was a deciding factor. In the debate in the House 
of Commons on 27 July 1877 the Government confirmed that there would be no 
superannuation allowance for Procurators Fiscal.57 That decision, it may be 
suggested, implied an intention not to add the many lawyers employed as local public 
prosecutors in Scotland to Treasury payrolls. The omission became a contentious 
issue that took 50 years to be resolved, with the passing of the Sheriff Court and 
Legal Officers (Scotland) Act 1927, and even then not satisfactorily.  
 
By 1877 the local public prosecutor was an identifiable officer in the Scottish legal 
system, apart from but not wholly independent of the local bench. It was a stable 
occupation and not necessarily dependent on variations of trade. The modernised 
system introduced by the 1877 Act was in place for 30 years. The Liberal 
Government that entered office at the end of 1905 did so, however, without a 
legislative plan: the reforms that emerged reflected initiatives taken by individual 
ministers and the pressure exerted through the party itself.58  
 
The Sheriff Courts (Scotland) Act 1907 by s.22 provided that the Lord Advocate 
alone could appoint the Procurators Fiscal for the Sheriff Court and by that single 
brief section it was assured that the local public prosecutor was independent of the 
local judiciary. Central decision making as to appointment suggested uniformity and 
thereafter parliamentary accountability. The balancing factor was the statutory 
provision protecting a Procurator Fiscal from arbitrary removal.59 At the very least, 
these changes seem to suggest a higher degree of professionalization.60  
 
The 1877 Act probably enhanced the office of Procurator Fiscal as the new 
appointees under the Act could say that they had executive approval. The legislative 
changes could not be tolerated politically if inconsistent with the Imperial model: a 
wide margin of appreciation was allowed by political managers but they knew limits 
                                                 
56
 (1906) 22 Scottish Law Review 37, p.43. 
57
 HC vol.236 col.11. 
58
 M. Pugh, The Triumph of the New Liberalism: 1899-1914, in R. Ingram and D. Brock (eds.) 
Peace, Reform and Liberation: A History of Liberal Politics in Britain, 1679-2011 (London: 
Biteback Publishing, 2011) pp.156-7.  
59
 Sheriff Court and Legal Officers (Scotland) Act 1927, s.1.  
60
 L. Farmer, Criminal Law, Tradition and Legal Order, Cambridge University Press, (1997) 
p.85.   
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when they saw them. What was the structure of authority and criminal business in the 
Sheriff Court of late-Victorian Scotland? To put the question another way: how was 
the process of investigating and discovering the facts and the fact-finding duties 
organised in order to determine or adjudicate disputes? 
 
First, the existence of the close professional relationship between the Sheriff and the 
Procurator Fiscal in the Sheriff Court meant that in practice the local empire had two 
emperors: one senior to the other and each watching but dependent on the other. It 
goes some way to explain the privileged and almost protected position of the local 
public prosecutor appearing for the public interest.61 It may be that in Scotland as has 
been suggested of England that there was a ruling class that controlled an institution 
like the law.62 The difference was, however, that the reform of 1877 implied the 
development of a degree of professionalism. The authority in the Sheriff Courts of 
Scotland began to be exercised by lawyers who were accountable, amongst each 
other and to the Imperial Parliament. 63  
 
Secondly, the inter-dependence of the Sheriff and the Procurator Fiscal identified the 
place of authority and emphasised a hierarchical organisation which tended to 
support or promotes certainty of decision making and uniform policies.64 The judicial 
hierarchy was delineated precisely with in ascending order Sheriff-Substitute, Sheriff 
and Senator of the College of Justice.65 Of course Sheriffs and the their Procurators 
Fiscal were required to work together to apply the law, but the implied answerability 
of the Procurator Fiscal to the Sheriff in addition to the directions in the Book of 
Regulations necessitated a reduction, or a real possibility of a reduction, of any 
residual discretion that a Procurator Fiscal might contemplate. Even that limited 
official discretion of the local public prosecutor while it remained unchecked made for 
a residual degree of predictability of outcome difficult. 66  
 
Finally, the 1877 Act may explain how little intellectual or principled opposition to the 
terms was directed at the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1887. That Act makes 
provision for implied conditions that prevent an accused avoiding the consequences 
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of his or her actions on technical grounds. The charge might either have implied 
conditions that catch the criminal behaviour or the charge might be amended to the 
same effect.67 Provided a Procurator Fiscal spotted a change, or presumably noticed 
a judicial hint, and moved quickly enough to take advantage in law of matters at proof 
being different from precognition then an appropriate motion saved the prosecution. 
Others might in their systems have seen a criminal prosecution as litigation 
amounting to a two-party contest but arrangements suggest that Scots lawyers saw a 
prosecution as an official inquiry.  
 
4 Concluding remarks 
The Sheriff Court (Scotland) Act 1877 became effective at the time that the 
separation of the functions of ‘judging’ and ‘prosecuting’ was under general 
consideration elsewhere in Europe.68 The location of authority is important in the 
context of seeking to understand the workings and perception of a system of 
administering criminal justice.69 Sheriffs who appointed their own Procurators Fiscal 
were hardly creating a diarchy but the inter-dependence may in practice have 
constituted a system of checks and balances by which one would mitigate any 
extremes of another.  
 
At the very least, the reform of 1877 suggests a development of the responsibility for 
governing the innovating forces of Victorian society between central and local, and 
public and private elements.70 The Sheriff Court was being modernised with its own 
legislation71 and yet it seems strange that the Imperial Parliament should find time to 
pass the Act when so many other matters were the subject of contemporary 
grievance.72 Perhaps the new legislation merely reflected the growing tendency for 
centralisation and accountability that was developing for Scotland.73  
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It is of relevance then that Sheriff-Substitute Russell opined: We have a thoroughly 
organised, and to some extent a centralised [emphasis in original] system’.74 
Moreover, there was criticism of the confidential investigations in Scotland, the 
‘resolution to prosecute...formed after a private inquiry’,75 in contrast to the open 
committal hearings in England. These comments are instructive in the context of the 
conventional contrast in criminal procedure between the system that emphasises the 
adversarial (or accusatorial) aspects of the Anglo-American process, and the non-
adversarial (or inquisitorial) character of the continental mode of proceedings.76 An 
alternative mode of analysis suggested has been to replace the conventional 
approach with a set of organising concepts.77 By that analysis greater insight may be 
gained into the larger divergences in the conception of the proper organisation of 
authority that was characteristic of the Continent and the English-speaking world.    
 
The system of values underlying the hierarchical model places a high premium on 
certainty of decision-making.78 In 1868 Procurators Fiscal had received from the 
Crown Office a Book of Regulations, a work that might reasonably be assessed as 
the procedural matrix then for the system of public prosecution in Scotland. There 
had been individual instructions earlier but the bound book of printed instructions 
appears to have been the most comprehensive then produced.79 The Book of 
Regulations was evidence of an evolving, and perhaps advanced, concentration of 
authority.80 Further, certainty in decision-making requires that uniform policies be 
developed. This has been described as centripetal, namely tending towards a centre 
and leads quite naturally to centralisation of authority.81 Incumbents of authority 
positions have no autonomous powers as authority is only delegated to them and its 
exercise must be closely watched. It is clear, and was even so in 1877, that all 
Procurators Fiscal in the Sheriff Court were under the general supervision of Crown 
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Counsel in Crown Office in Edinburgh to whom Procurators Fiscal were answerable 
for all actions and decisions. 82  
 
The nature of the business in practice may itself have induced a general uniformity of 
purpose amongst Procurators Fiscal merely by their all performing the same tasks. 
The arrival in offices of a new Book of Regulations probably signified a milestone that 
constituted real cohesion. The existing authority of Crown Office was enhanced by 
this event. It is not difficult to see probable reasoning: a hierarchical model sought to 
guide its officials by suggesting approaches for anticipated circumstances. 83 
 
However, it may be suggested that the statutory change in 1877 of the authority of a 
Sheriff to appoint the Procurator Fiscal for the public interest without reference to 
anyone else was in effect a diminution of judicial control over the fact-finding and 
fact-adducing phases of the criminal process. In order to obtain the approval of a 
Principal Secretary of State something, but perhaps not much, by way of justification 
would be necessary. 84 
 
Further, no Procurator Fiscal could be imposed on a Sheriff as the Act of 1877 
merely required the Sheriff to obtain approval, on unspecified grounds, for the 
preferred appointee. Such permissive legislation was entirely characteristic of the 
measures of the contemporary government.85 The exercise of authority under the 
new legislation left a very limited role for the State. Reform of the structure of the 
legal system as well as the law was in any event necessary as the inexorable growth 
of summary offences meant that the costs of proof of criminal responsibility were 
seen as disproportionate to the multiplying regulatory functions that the criminal law 
was being required to perform.86 
 
The reform in the 1877 Act separated any concentration of power albeit with residual 
co-dependence between Sheriff-Substitute and Procurator Fiscal. The Procurator 
Fiscal could with security of tenure set down all the business that a Sheriff-Substitute 
                                                 
82
 R.S. Shiels, ‘Crown Counsel’, in J. Chalmers, et al (eds.) Essays in Criminal Law in Honour 
of Sir Gerald Gordon, (Edinburgh University Press, 2010). 
83
 Damaska, ‘Structures of Authority and Comparative Criminal Procedure’, p.484-5. 
84
 e.g. ‘I have known professionally the preferred appointee for some years and I am confident 
of his ability to meet the requirements of the public office for which I recommend him’.  
85
 R. Harris, The Conservatives: A History, (London: Bantam Press, 2011) p.147.  
86
 N. Lacey, Character, Capacity and Outcome, in MD. Dubber and L. Farmer (eds.) Modern 
Histories of Crime and Punishment (Stanford University Press, 2007) at p.22. 
Law, Crime and History (2014) 3 
72 
 
was required to adjudicate upon.87 The Crown by the hands of the Procurator Fiscal 
exercised in practice subject to the supervision Crown Counsel a principle of 
expediency that allowed discretion to decline to prosecute or to withdraw from judicial 
consideration a particular case. 88  
 
It remains doubtful if Sheriffs, or any other group, in the Scottish legal system of the 
mid- to late-Victorian era were pursuing, knowingly, an adversarial ideology as such. 
On the contrary, the system indicated markers of a hierarchical system. Assessing 
the true nature of what might now be called the criminal justice system in 1877 is 
difficult: ‘Adversarial procedure entrusts the responsibility for gathering and 
presenting the evidence upon which accurate adjudication depends to partisans 
whose interests is in winning, not in truth.’89 Under the Scottish system Sheriffs 
entrusted the responsibility for gathering and presenting the evidence upon which 
accurate adjudication depended to particular local solicitors. What constituted 
‘winning’ in the forensic context was and remains an elusive concept.   
 
The preferred system of law when introducing British governance to new territorial 
acquisitions in the Imperial age was English law, which was doubtless part of what 
has been described as the ‘information milieu’ of imperial policy-makers.90 Whether 
the Scottish legal system before or after the reform of 1877 is labelled ‘inquisitorial’ or 
in any other way hardly matters but it was not predicated on any theoretical and 
meaningful right in law of the citizen to take matters into their own hands and 
prosecute at will. The public prosecutor was the key official and any French influence 
was not a matter of regret.91 
 
Scotland in the mid-Victorian era came to be subject increasingly to the constitutional 
discipline of Westminster after generations of minimal central control. Political 
accountability was increasingly necessary and political cohesion required a focus of 
loyalty: constitutional monarchy was acceptable pragmatically but in 1877 the 
personal future of Queen Victoria was uncertain and increasingly democratic ideas 
introduced other considerations. Lawyers in Scotland were probably the principal 
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group with whom central British administrators could collaborate meaningfully as the 
local gatekeepers.92  
 
Politically, in the 1860s the nations of the United Kingdom were still drawing together, 
and progressive people then favoured amalgamating smaller states into larger 
ones.93 The Sheriff Court (Scotland) Act 1877 consolidated, that is to say introduced, 
a degree of parliamentary supervision. Such accountability went someway to stifling 
any developing enthusiasm amongst Scots lawyers for, or subliminal drift towards, 
the conceptual basis of continental criminal procedure. That would have been almost 
certainly too inconsistent with the preferred British model. This was the period in the 
nineteenth century of a general feeling in the Imperial Parliament of fear of 
Continental criminal jurisprudence.94 There remained also a concern for the potential 
abuse in the office of public prosecutor. 95 
 
Conclusion  
Adversarial or inquisitorial systems are still discussed in the modern era as structural 
models or arrangements for prosecution.96 It is suggested, however, that a better 
lens for an analysis of the appointment and accountability of a Procurator Fiscal in 
the Sheriff Court are the comparative hierarchical or co-ordinate models because of 
the subtlety of criminal procedures. The slow and incremental changes, such as that 
in 1877, were not evidence of the unequivocal existence of either an adversarial 
system or, separately, an inquisitorial system but rather one which in practice 
demonstrated many varied jurisprudential influences.     
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